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U.S. Export Controls
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The United States imposes export controls to protect national security interests and promote foreign policy objectives related to dual-use items and less-sensitive military items through the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 CFR Parts 730 – 774). China’s pursuit of military modernization through its national “military-civil fusion” (MCF) strategy deliberately blurs and eliminates boundaries between the military-industrial complex, academia, and the private sector to ensure all elements of China’s economy and civil society are able to contribute technology and other resources to advance the People’s Liberation Army.  The MCF policy can make it difficult for U.S. companies and investors to identify China-based counterparts with links to military end-users, which is a source of compliance risk.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is responsible for regulating, implementing, and enforcing export controls for such dual-use items and less sensitive military items. Within BIS, Export Administration (EA) is responsible for processing license applications, counselling exporters, and drafting and publishing changes to the EAR; and Export Enforcement (EE) is responsible for compliance monitoring and enforcement of the EAR. BIS works closely with U.S. embassies, foreign governments, industry, and trade associations to ensure that the export, reexport and transfer (in-country) of items subject to the EAR, as well as specific activities of U.S. persons related to certain weapons of mass destruction and military-intelligence end uses and end users is accomplished in compliance with the regulations. 

Enforcement

BIS officials conduct site visits, known as End-Use Checks (EUCs), globally with end-users, consignees, and/or other parties related to transactions involving items subject to the EAR and shipped under a license, another form of BIS authorization, or as “no license required.” An EUC is an on-site verification of a non-U.S. party to a transaction, conducted as part of BIS’s licensing process as well as its compliance program, to determine whether the party is a reliable recipient of items subject to the EAR and is in compliance with the EAR and the conditions of a license or other authorization, if applicable. Specifically, EUC verifies the bona fides of transactions subject to the EAR, including confirming the legitimacy and reliability of the end use and end-user; monitoring compliance with license conditions; and ensuring items are exported, reexported or transferred (in-country) in accordance with the EAR.  These checks might be completed prior to the export of items pursuant to a BIS export license in the form of a Pre-License Check (PLC) or following an export during a Post-Shipment Verification (PSV), regardless of whether a BIS license is required.

BIS officials rely on EUCs to safeguard items subject to the EAR from diversion to unauthorized end uses/users and destinations. The verification of a foreign party’s reliability facilitates future trade, including during BIS license reviews. If BIS is unable to verify the reliability of the company or is prevented from accomplishing an EUC, the company may receive, for example, more regulatory scrutiny during license application reviews or be designated on BIS’s Unverified List or Entity List, as applicable. 

Guidance and Training 

BIS has developed a list of “red flags”, or warning signs, and compiled “Know Your Customer” guidance intended to aid exporters in identifying possible violations of the EAR. Both resources are publicly available, and their dissemination to industry members is highly encouraged to help promote EAR compliance.

BIS also provides a variety of training sessions for exporters throughout the year.  These sessions range from one to two-day seminars that focus on the basics of exporting to coverage of more advanced, industry-specific topics. Interested parties can check a list of upcoming seminars and webinars or reference BIS’s online training site.  BIS’s Export Control Officers (ECOs) located at U.S. embassies and consulates in seven overseas locations also conduct outreach to raise awareness of reexport and transfer (in-country) requirements with foreign business communities. 

Commerce Control List

The EAR regulate transactions involving the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of “dual-use” commodities, software, and technology, collectively, “items” (i.e., those with both civilian and military applications) and less sensitive military items, as well as certain U.S. person activities.  Items subject to BIS’s jurisdiction include items listed on the Commerce Control List (supplement no. 1 to part 774 of the EAR) (CCL); items on the CCL are listed under individual entry by Export Control Classification Number (ECCN).  The EAR also regulates items designated as ‘EAR99’ (a broad category of items generally consisting of low-technology consumer goods not listed under an ECCN on the CCL but subject to BIS’s jurisdiction).  For regulatory requirements on items under the export control jurisdiction of other U.S. Government agencies, exporters should consult those U.S. Government agencies. For example, the U.S. Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has authority over defense articles and defense services pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR pasts 120-130).  A list of other agencies involved in export controls can be found on the BIS website and in Supplement No. 3 to Part 730 of the EAR.

The EAR is available on the e-CFR (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations) and is updated as needed. 

Consolidated Screening List 

The Consolidated Screening List (CSL), available on the International Trade Administration’s Trade.gov website, is a list of parties for which the United States Government maintains restrictions or prohibitions on certain exports, reexports or in-country transfers of items.  The CSL consolidates export screening lists implemented by the Departments of Commerce, State, and the Treasury into a single data feed as an aid to industry in conducting electronic screening of parties to regulated transactions.  Exporters should determine the export requirements specific to their proposed transaction by classifying their items prior to export and reviewing the EAR’s requirements specific to the item(s), the destination, and the proposed end use and end user, as well as consulting the CSL to determine if any parties to the transaction may be subject to specific license requirements.

Assistance is available from BIS by calling one of the following numbers:

  • (202) 482-4811 – Outreach and Educational Services Division (located in Washington, DC – open Monday-Friday, 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. ET)
  • (949) 660-0144 – Western Regional Office (located in Irvine, CA – open Monday-Friday, 8:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. PT)
  • (408) 998-8806 – Northern California branch (located in San Jose, CA – open Monday-Friday, 8:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. PT)

You may also e-mail your inquiry to the Export Counseling Division of the Office of Exporter Services at ECDOEXS@bis.doc.gov.  

Contact information for BIS’s overseas ECOs can be found at:  Office of Enforcement Analysis (OEA) | Bureau of Industry and Security

Under the EAR, a license is required to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of certain controlled items to specified end-uses or end-users in China, and certain additional recordkeeping and administrative requirements may apply. For instance, in certain instances set forth in 15 C.F.R. § 748.10, applicants must request that the importer obtain a PRC End-User Statement from China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), including for license applications involving items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) valued over $50,000.  In certain circumstances, a PRC End-User Statement may also be required for transactions of a lower dollar value. (See 15 C.F.R. § 748.10(a)(1) and (2)).  With limited exceptions, U.S. exporters also must file Electronic Export Information in the Automated Export System and must provide the ECCN and other required information for any export of tangible items on the CCL destined to China, regardless of value or whether a license is required for export. (See 15 C.F.R. § 758.1(b)(10)).

Generally, the licensing policy for China is to approve items destined to civil end users for civil end uses.  In addition to the license requirements for items specified on the CCL, there are additional restrictions on items listed in Supplement No. 2 to Part 744 of the EAR if you have “knowledge,” as defined in 15 C.F.R. § 772.1, that those items are intended, entirely or in part, for a ‘military end use’ or ‘military end user’ as those terms are defined in 15 C.F.R. § 744.21.  In addition, a license is required for any item subject to the EAR if you have “knowledge” that the items are intended, entirely or in part, for a ‘military-intelligence end use’ or to a ‘military-intelligence end user’ as those terms are defined in 15 C.F.R. § 744.22, or if a U.S. person, wherever located, is providing any ‘support’ as defined in 15 C.F.R. § 744.6(b) for a ‘military-intelligence end use’ or ‘military-intelligence end user’. Similarly, there are license requirements for any item subject to the EAR where you have “knowledge” that the item will be used for certain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) related end uses, or if a U.S. person, wherever located, is providing any ‘support’ as defined in 15 C.F.R. § 744.6(b) for certain WMD end uses.  These license applications generally are reviewed with a presumption of denial. See Parts 742 and 744 of the EAR for additional license review policies and end use and end user controls.  Regarding the latter, end user-based license requirements generally apply to all items subject to the EAR; entities subject to end user-based license requirements are included in the CSL. 

In particular, exporters should be aware of license requirements introduced in October 2022 and expanded or clarified in October 2023, April 2024, and December 2024 regarding certain advanced computing integrated circuits, semiconductor manufacturing items, and supercomputing or semiconductor manufacturing end uses in the PRC.  These controls restrict not only the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of certain items to the PRC, as well as to PRC-headquartered companies worldwide, but also the provision by U.S. persons of certain services that could support the production in the PRC of advanced node integrated circuits.  These controls also created several new Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules, extending jurisdiction over specified foreign-made items related to advanced computing items, supercomputers, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment.  Additional information is available on the BIS Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items Controls to PRC website.

Likewise, in August 2023, BIS expanded controls on certain unilaterally controlled nuclear-related items identified on the CCL and controlled for nuclear nonproliferation column 2 (NP2) reasons to China.  This action was taken in conjunction with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s suspension of certain general licenses for the export of certain nuclear materials to the PRC and is intended to ensure that these items are only being used for peaceful purposes, such as commercial nuclear power generation.

Exporters are urged to check lists identifying specific persons, companies, and entities that are under U.S. government restrictions or for whom export licenses or other authorization may be required. Information on these lists, which include the Entity List, Denied Persons List, Unverified List, Military End-User List maintained by BIS, and the CSL, which consolidates these four lists and other U.S. government restricted parties lists, is available on the www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern.

Entities for which there is reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable facts, that the entity has been involved, is involved, or poses a significant risk of being or becoming involved in activities that are contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States and those acting on behalf of such entities may be added to the Entity List. (See 15 C.F.R. § 744.11(b)). Inclusion on BIS’s Entity List creates a license requirement for the export, reexport, and transfer (in country) of items subject to the EAR to listed parties, or where such entities are parties to the transaction as described in 15 C.F.R. § 748.5(c) through (f).  Those licensing requirements are supplemental to license requirements elsewhere in the EAR.  Exports, reexports, and transfers (in country) to listed entities generally require a license regardless of the item’s classification (EAR99 or under an ECCN).  Specific license requirements are included within the entity’s Entity List entry. For example, a listing may indicate a license requirement for only those items on the CCL or for only specified ECCNs.  In recent years, the additions of Chinese entities on the Entity List have been predicated upon a determination that those entities have been involved in prohibited military end use activities, diverted EAR items to restricted destinations (e.g., Russia), or enabled human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) or against people from that region, among other reasons. 

Exporters should also consult the updated Xinjiang Supply Chain Business advisory for additional information relevant to conducting business within the XUAR.  On July 13, 2021, the U.S. Department of State, alongside the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and the U.S. Department of Labor issued an updated Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory to highlight the heightened risks for businesses with supply chain and investment links to Xinjiang, given the entities’ complicity in forced labor and other human rights abuses there and throughout China:  https://www.state.gov/xinjiang-supply-chain-business-advisory/.

Validated End-User Program 

End users in China can apply for the Validated End-User (VEU) program pursuant to the requirements set forth in 15 C.F.R. § 748.15.  This allows end users who have an established track record of exclusive engagement in appropriate end-use activities to receive exports of specified items for civil end uses without the need for their suppliers to first obtain individual export or reexport licenses.  Interested companies can apply by submitting a request for an advisory opinion to BIS, as described in Section 748.15 of the EAR. 

Additional Information
Exporters should consult the EAR for information on how export license requirements may apply to the shipment of their items to China.  If necessary, a commodity classification request may be submitted to determine how an item is controlled (i.e., the ECCN).  Exporters may also request a written advisory opinion from BIS about the application of the EAR’s end-use- and end-user-based licensing requirements.  

Additional information about the export controls administered by BIS may be obtained from BIS’s website (www.bis.gov), or by contacting one of BIS’s counseling desks or BIS Export Control Officers at the U.S. Commercial Service, U.S. Embassy Beijing.

BIS Counseling Desks:

  • (202) 482-4811 - Outreach and Educational Services Division (located in Washington, DC – open Monday-Friday, 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. ET)
    (949) 660-0144 - Western Regional Office (located in Irvine, CA – open Monday-Friday, 8:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. PT)
    (408) 998-8806 - Northern California branch (located in San Jose, CA – open Monday-Friday, 8:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. PT)

E-mail your inquiry to the Export Counseling Division of the Office of Exporter Services at ECDOEXS@bis.doc.gov
BIS Export Control Officers (Beijing, China):

  • Tel: (86) (10) 8531-3301
    Tel: (86) (10) 8531-4484

Select Legislation, Executive Orders, or Regulatory Actions Impacting Exports or Reexports to China

In 1990, the U.S. Congress passed P.L. 101-246, Title IX, which is commonly referred to as the “Tiananmen Square Sanctions.”  Among other things, this law restricts the U.S. licensing of exports and reexports of crime control and crime detection equipment and instruments subject to the EAR to China, as well as the licensing of defense articles and defense services subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  These restrictions apply regardless of the end user in China. Pursuant to § 742.6(b)(1)(i) of the EAR, exports of certain 9x515 and “600 series” items are also reviewed in accordance with the ITAR license review policy set forth in 22 C.F.R. § 126.1 (i.e., pursuant to a policy of denial).

In addition, although foreign-made items incorporating less than 25 percent controlled U.S.-origin content are generally not subject to the EAR for purposes of export or reexport to China, § 734.4 provides that there is no de minimis level for exports to China of foreign-made items incorporating U.S.-origin “600-series” and 9x515 content.  Items classified under these ECCNs were previously listed on the Department of State’s United States Munitions List (USML) and cannot be exported, reexported, or transferred (in-country) to China without prior authorization from BIS.   In addition, 15 C.F.R. § 734.4 provides that there is no de minimis level for exports to China of certain foreign-made items related to the Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment (SME) FDP and Footnote 5 FDP.

Certain foreign-produced “direct products” of U.S.-origin national security-controlled or “600-series” or 9D515 or 9E515 software or technology are subject to the EAR, as well as certain foreign-produced items which are the product of a complete plant or major component of a plant which is itself the “direct product” of U.S.-origin 9E515 technology (see § 734.9(b)-(c)) of the EAR).  Additionally, pursuant to footnote 1 to Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the EAR and 15 C.F.R. § 734.9(e)(1), certain foreign-produced items are subject to a licensing requirement for their reexport, export from abroad, or transfer (in country) when there is knowledge that they will be incorporated into, or will be used in the “production” or “development” of any “part,” “component,” or equipment produced, purchased, or ordered by any entity on the Entity List with a footnote 1 designation or when any entity with a footnote 1 designation is a party to the transaction and are:

  • The direct product of “technology” or “software” that is subject to the EAR and specified in ECCNs 3D001, 3D901, 3D991, 3D992, 3D993, 3D994, 3E001, 3E002, 3E003, 3E901, 3E991, 3E992, 3E993, 3E994, 4D001, 4D993, 4D994, 4E001, 4E992, 4E993, 5D001, 5D991, 5E001, or 5E991
     
  • Produced by any complete plant or major component of a plant that is located outside the United States, when the plant or major component of a plant, whether made in the United States. or a foreign country, itself is a direct product of U.S.-origin “technology” or “software” subject to the EAR that is specified in certain ECCNs 3D001, 3D901, 3D991, 3D992, 3D993, 3D994, 3E001, 3E002, 3E003, 3E901, 3E991, 3E992, 3E993, 3E994, 4D001, 4D993, 4D994, 4E001, 4E992, 4E993, 5D001, 5D991, 5E001, or 5E991

Further, as part of the “Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modifications” rule announced on October 7, 2022 (87 Fed. Reg. 62186 (Oct. 13, 2022)), BIS added new product and end-user scopes to the Entity List FDP rule set forth at 15 C.F.R. § 734.9(e) related to certain PRC entities that are designated with a Footnote 4 on the Entity List.  These entities are involved in supercomputer or advanced integrated circuit-related activities, and the Footnote 4 Entity List FDP rule restricts their ability to obtain foreign-produced chips and other items.  For entities with a Footnote 4 designation, a foreign-produced item is subject to the EAR if it meets the specific parameters for the “Product Scope” and “End user scope” set forth in 15 C.F.R. § 734.9(e)(2).

In October 2023 and again in April 2024 and December 2024, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a package of rules designed to update and clarify export controls on advanced computing semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, as well as items that support supercomputing applications and end-uses, to arms embargoed countries, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These rules reinforce controls imposed in October 2022 to restrict the PRC’s ability to both purchase and manufacture certain high-end chips critical for military advantage. These updates are necessary to maintain the effectiveness of these controls, close loopholes, and ensure they remain durable. These controls were strategically crafted to address, among other concerns, the PRC’s efforts to obtain semiconductor manufacturing equipment essential to producing advanced integrated circuits needed for the next generation of advanced weapon systems, as well as high-end advanced computing semiconductors necessary to enable the development and production of technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) used in military applications. Advanced AI capabilities—facilitated by supercomputing, built on advanced semiconductors— present U.S. national security concerns because they can be used to improve the speed and accuracy of military decision making, planning, and logistics. They can also be used for cognitive electronic warfare, radar, signals intelligence, and jamming. These capabilities can also create concerns when they are used to support facial recognition surveillance systems for human rights violations and abuses.

As part of BIS’s rule, “Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items” announced in December 2024 (89 Fed. Reg. 96790 (Dec. 5, 2024), BIS created two new FDPs related to the production of “Advanced-Node ICs”, including a SME FDP extending jurisdiction over specified foreign-produced SME and related items if there is “knowledge” that the foreign-produced commodity is destined to Macau or a destination in Country Group D:5, including the PRC, as well as a Footnote 5 FDP, extending jurisdiction over specified foreign-produced SME and related items if there is “knowledge” of certain involvement by an entity on or added to the Entity List with a FN5 designation.

Transactions involving China may implicate review by the https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) expanded the jurisdiction of CFIUS to address growing national security concerns over foreign exploitation of certain investment structures which traditionally had fallen outside of CFIUS jurisdiction. Through FIRRMA, CFIUS jurisdiction was expanded beyond transactions that could result in foreign control of a U.S. business to also include non-controlling investments, direct or indirect, by a foreign person in certain circumstances, and applies to non-controlling investments in U.S. business that are related to critical technologies, critical infrastructure, businesses with sensitive personal data, as well as certain types of real estate transactions.  In addition, BIS in conjunction with the International Trade Administration, worked with Treasury to draft and implement the Outbound Investment Regulation, published in November 2024.  This new program places a prohibition and notification requirement on certain investments made by U.S. persons in China in order to avoid enhancing potential military capabilities in the areas of semiconductors, quantum computing and artificial intelligence.  For more information, see Outbound Investment Security Program | U.S. Department of the Treasury. 

Related Controls 

Other U.S. agencies also regulate exports of items.  For example, the U.S. Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls administers U.S. export controls covering defense articles and defense services that appear on the USML under the ITAR.  Information on U.S. Department of State export licensing procedures, the ITAR, and the Arms Export Control Act can be found at Tel: (202) 663-1282.

The point of contact for U.S. Department of State licensing issues at the U.S. Embassy Beijing is the Economic Section, Tel: (86) (10) 8531-3000, Fax: (86) (10) 8531-4949.

The Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, FDA, and other agencies may also control and license the export of specified items to China.  The Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection enforces a number of Withhold Release Orders (WRO) issued against specified Xinjiang-produced products. 

China Export Controls and Supply Chain Risk 

U.S. firms sourcing or manufacturing in China should be vigilant about PRC export controls, which now extend well beyond rare-earths into strategic minerals like gallium, germanium, and graphite. According to the USTR’s 2025 National Trade Estimate, Beijing regularly introduces new licensing requirements for these critical inputs—typically with little warning, minimal transparency, and both broad and invasive documentation demands. The implementation of controls has been uneven—marked by delayed approvals, inconsistent regional enforcement, and capacity limitations—causing global supply chain disruptions and raising concerns that export curbs may be used as geopolitical leverage. Companies should therefore consider robust risk mitigation strategies, such as supplier diversification, buffering inventories, and contingency planning, before embarking on China-centric manufacturing strategies.