South Korea Country Commercial Guide
Learn about the market conditions, opportunities, regulations, and business conditions in South Korea, prepared by at U.S. Embassies worldwide by Commerce Department, State Department and other U.S. agencies’ professionals.
Energy
Last published date:

Energy: Power Generation Mix, LNG and Commercial Nuclear Power

Overview

According to the Korean government (MOTIR/KEEI/KESIS) data used in the 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand (BPESD) framework, Korea’s total electricity generation in 2024 reached 595.6 TWh, up 1.3% from the previous year. Nuclear power generated 188.8TWh, accounting for 31.7% of the total, and became Korea’s largest single power source in 18 years.  Coal and LNG each generated 167.2TWh, or 28.1%, while renewable energy reached 63.2TWh, or 10.6%.

On a provisional January-November 2025 basis, Korea’s power generation remained broadly stable, with total generation estimated at 543.6TWh. Nuclear power remained the largest single source at 169.3TWh, or 31.1%, while coal and LNG continued to account for substantial shares at 157.9TWh and 148.5TWh, respectively. Renewable generation remained at 57.6TWh, or 10.6%. These provisional figures should be updated once KEPCO publishes the 2026 edition of Korea Electric Power Statistics with finalized 2025 annual data.

Korea’s generation mix continues to shift under the 11th BPESD, which was finalized in February 2025 and covers the 2024-2038 period. The plan targets a 2030 generation mix of nuclear 31.8%, coal 17.2%, LNG 25.1%, renewable energy 18.8%, new energy 2.9%, clean hydrogen and ammonia 2.4%, and other sources 1.8%. By 2038, the plan targets nuclear power 35.2%, coal 10.1%, LNG 10.5%, renewable energy 29.2%, new energy 3.7%, clean hydrogen and ammonia 6.2%, and other sources 5.0%.

The Lee Jae Myung administration, which took office in June 2025, is developing a new BPESD framework, particularly considering growing energy security concerns, demand from AI/data centers, grid constraints, and renewable energy and climate policy priorities. The administration is expected to continue supporting civil nuclear exports while placing greater emphasis on renewable energy expansion, grid investment, and the integration of climate and energy policy.

The government’s organizational restructuring has shifted parts of Korea’s energy and climate policy plans toward the new Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment (MCEE). Nuclear-related responsibilities remain divided across multiple institutions, with MOTIR retaining roles related to nuclear industry and exports, Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) overseeing nuclear R&D, and Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC)/Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) retaining regulatory and safety oversight. Opportunities in nuclear energy, LNG, grid infrastructure, and renewable energy will be pursued through coordinated, multi-agency engagement among the relevant Korean ministries and agencies.

Frequent shifts in Korea’s energy policy direction across administrations have increased uncertainty for market participants. However, Korea’s power sector continues to face several recurring priorities: expanding carbon-free energy, maintaining nuclear power as a major low-carbon and reliable source of generation, and relying on LNG in the short to medium term to support grid reliability, manage renewable intermittency, and respond to demand volatility.  This approach includes scaling up solar and wind power while developing co-combusting ammonia and clean hydrogen technologies.  The government also plans to expand Korea’s transmission grid under the “Energy Highway” policy and address transmission and distribution bottlenecks.

Table: Korea’s Power Generation Mix according to the 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand (BPESD) 
    (unit: TWh and mix ratio in%)

 

Nuclear

Coal

LNG

Renewable

New

Clean hydrogen and ammonia

Others

Total

 

 

PV, bio, hydro, wind, tidal, waste power

Fuel cells, IGCC, CTL, CTG

Carbon Energy

Carbon Free Energy (CFE)

2022

176.1

193.2

163.6

53.2

0.9

0

8.4

595.3

366.0

229.3

29.6%

32.5%

27.5%

8.9%

0.1%

0.0%

1.4%

100%

61.5%

38.5%

2023

180.5

184.9

157.7

49.4

7.2

0

8.3

588

358.1

229.9

30.7%

31.4%

26.8%

8.4%

1.2%

0.0%

1.4%

100%

60.9%

39.1%

2024

188.8

167.2

167.2

63.2

7.3

0.8

4.5

595.6

342.85

252.8

31.7%

28.1%

28.1%

10.6%

1.2%

0.1%

0.8%

100.0%

57.6%

42.4%

2025 (Jan.-Nov. est.)

169.3

157.9

148.5

57.6

7.7

0.3

2.3

543.6

316.4

227.2

31.1%

29.0%

27.3%

10.6%

1.4%

0.1%

0.4%

100.0%

58.2%

41.8%

2030 (target)

204.2

110.5

161

120.9

18.7

15.5

11.8

642.6

302.0

340.6

31.8%

17.2%

25.1%

18.8%

2.9%

2.4%

1.8%

100%

47.0%

53.0%

2038 (target)

248.3

70.9

74.3

205.7

26.4

43.9

34.9

704.4

206.5

497.9

35.2%

10.1%

10.5%

29.2%

3.7%

6.2%

5.0%

100%

29.3%

70.7%

Note: CFE = nuclear + renewable + clean hydrogen and ammonia.  2025 figures are provisional Jan.–Nov. estimates from KESIS/KEEI and should be updated once MOTIR and KEPCO publish the 2026 edition of Korea Electric Power Statistics with finalized 2025 annual data.

Source: the 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources (MOTIR)

Electricity Market and Governance

Korea’s energy sector opportunities are shaped not only by generation mix targets, but also by electricity market reform and changes in energy governance. Although Korea’s energy market remains centralized, recent policy measures are beginning to introduce more localized and distributed transaction models. The Special Act on Activation of Distributed Energy implemented in June 2024 is intended to support distributed resources and regional power transactions. It allows eligible smaller generation facilities and integrated energy systems to sell power within defined regions, while wholesale electricity prices are also calculated separately by region.  

Such legislation and regional power transactions are expected to gradually change Korea’s traditional centralized market structure, which has historically been anchored by state-owned Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), its power generation companies (GENCOs), and Independent Power Producers (IPPs) through Korea Power Exchange (KPX) administered wholesale transactions.

Establishment of the new Ministry of Climate, Energy, and Environment (MCEE) and the broader energy governance restructuring should also be monitored carefully as its climate and energy role may influence how nuclear power is evaluated alongside renewables, grid investment, and decarbonization goals. For market participants, the key implication is not that nuclear policy has moved to a single ministry, but that nuclear energy, LNG, grid infrastructure, renewable energy, climate policy, industrial competitiveness, nuclear exports, nuclear R&D, and safety regulation will still require coordination among several Korean ministries, regulators, and implementing agencies.

Overall, the new administration is likely to pursue a more balanced energy policy that expands renewable energy and grid investment while maintaining nuclear power as a major low-carbon generation source and LNG as a flexible resource during the transition. Market participants will need to watch how these priorities are translated into actual policy, regulation, utility planning, and market rules.

Nuclear

Korea has 26 nuclear reactors, 23 of which are currently in operation, with total installed nuclear generating capacity of approximately 26 gigawatts electric (GW(e)). By installed nuclear capacity, Korea ranks behind the United States, France, China, and Russia, which have approximately 97GWe, 63GWe, 55GWe, and 27GWe, respectively, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). On a provisional January-November 2025 basis, nuclear generation stood at 169.3TWh, or 31.1% of total generation, remaining the largest single source in Korea’s electricity mix. Higher nuclear output has helped Korea reduce reliance on coal and LNG generation. Further increases in nuclear utilization will depend on grid capacity, maintenance schedules, public acceptance, regulatory approvals, and policy decisions on new reactors, lifetime extensions, and the balance between nuclear and renewables.

The Lee administration continues to recognize nuclear power’s role in energy security, low-carbon generation, and export competitiveness.  Under the current 11th BPESD, Korea targets nuclear generation of 204.2TWh by 2030 and 248.3TWh by 2038, representing 31.8% and 35.2% of total generation, respectively. The plan also includes two large nuclear reactors and one SMR by 2038, subject to future siting, licensing, policy, and project development processes.

Table 2: List of nuclear power plants in Korea

 

NAME

LOCATION

TYPE

Capa. (MWe)

Ground-breaking

Operation date

Status

Kori-2

Jangan-eup, Kijang-Geun, Busan

PWR

650

12/04/77

07/25/83

Taken offline on 3/8/23, 9/28/24, and 8/6/25 and waits for a decision on its operation license renewal

Kori-3 

PWR

950

10/01/79

09/30/85

Kori-4 

PWR

950

04/01/80

04/29/86

Shin-Kori-1

PWR

1,000

01/17/05

02/28/11

in operation

Shin-Kori-2

PWR

1,000

01/17/05

07/20/12

in operation

Saeul-1

Ulju-gun, Ulsan

PWR

1,400

12/2015

12/20/16

in operation 

Saeul-2

PWR

1,400

12/2015

08/29/19

in operation

Saeul-3

Ulju-gun, Ulsan

PWR

1,400

06/2016

n/a

Former Shin-Kori-5

Expected to be in operation in the first half of 2026.

Saeul-4

PWR

1,400

06/2016

n/a

Former Shin-Kori-6

Expected to be in operation in 2027.

Wolsong-2

Gyeongju-si, Gyeongsangbuk-do

PHWR

700

06/22/92

07/01/97

in operation

Wolsong-3

PHWR

700

03/17/94

07/01/98

in operation

Wolsong-4

PHWR

700

07/22/94

10/01/99

in operation

Shin-Wolsong-1 

PWR

1,000

10/01/05

07/31/12

in operation

Shin-Wolsong-2 

PWR

1,000

10/01/05

07/24/15

in operation

Hanbit-1

Yeonggwang-gun, Jeollanam-do

PWR

950

06/04/81

08/25/86

in operation

Hanbit-2

PWR

950

12/01/81

06/10/87

in operation

Hanbit-3

PWR

1,000

12/23/89

03/31/95

in operation

Hanbit-4

PWR

1,000

05/26/90

01/01/96

in operation

Hanbit-5

PWR

1,000

06/29/97

05/21/02

in operation

Hanbit-6

PWR

1,000

11/20/97

12/24/02

in operation

Hanul-1

Uljin-gun, Gyeongsangbuk-do

PWR

950

01/26/83

09/10/88

in operation

Hanul-2

PWR

950

07/05/83

09/30/89

in operation

Hanul-3

PWR

1,000

07/21/93

08/11/98

in operation

Hanul-4

PWR

1,000

11/01/93

12/31/99

in operation

Hanul-5

PWR

1,000

10/01/99

07/29/04

in operation

Hanul-6

PWR

1,000

09/29/00

04/22/05

in operation

Shin-Hanul-1

PWR

1,400

04/30/10

12/07/22

in operation

Shin-Hanul-2

 

PWR

1,400

04/30/10

04/05/24

in operation

Shin-Hanul-3

 

PWR

1,400

09/13/24

n/a

Expected to be in operation by Oct. 2033

Shin-Hanul-4

 

PWR

1,400

09/13/24

n/a

Expected to be in operation by Oct. 2033

Kori-1

Gijang-gun, Busan

PWR

587

04/27/72

04/29/78

Permanently shut down on 6/18/17

Wolsong-1

Gyeongju-si, Gyeongsangbuk-do

PHWR

679

10/30/77

04/22/83

Permanently shut down on 12/24/19

(Data as of September 25, 2025)
Source: Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd. (KHNP)

 

 

Korea’s nuclear governance remains a multi-institutional framework. MOTIR is expected to remain important for the nuclear industry, exports, supply chains, EPC, manufacturing, and industrial competitiveness; MSIT retains responsibility for nuclear R&D and advanced nuclear technology development; and NSSC/KINS remain central to safety regulation and licensing. MCEE’s climate and energy role may influence how nuclear power is evaluated alongside renewables, grid investment, and decarbonization goals.

Liquified Natural Gas (LNG)

Korea remains a major long-term buyer of LNG and an important market for U.S. exporters. Recent procurement trends position the U.S. as one of Korea’s major LNG suppliers, while U.S. LNG also offers destination flexibility and portfolio value compared with more traditional long-term supply arrangements.

Korea’s LNG demand faces medium- to long-term uncertainty due to changes in the power generation mix, renewable energy expansion, nuclear output, and the transition to carbon-free fuels such as hydrogen and ammonia. Under the 11th BPESD, LNG-fired generation is targeted at 161TWh, or 25.1% of total generation, in 2030 and 74.3TWh, or 10.5%, in 2038. This indicates that LNG will remain important in the short to medium term, but its long-term share is expected to decline sharply as carbon-free power expands.

In 2025, LNG-fired generation appears to have remained under pressure from higher nuclear output and continued policy emphasis on carbon-free energy. At the same time, LNG remains a flexible source of generation that can respond to peak demand, renewable intermittency, and power system balancing needs. Korea’s long-term LNG contracting strategy is therefore likely to continue balancing security of supply with portfolio flexibility and spot-market trading options. The U.S. remained the world’s largest LNG exporter in 2024, following its first full-year top position in 2023. U.S. LNG exports to Asia increased notably in 2024, and U.S. exports to Korea also increased. Korea’s LNG import base remained diversified, with Australia, Qatar, the United States, Malaysia, Indonesia, Russia, and Oman among the major suppliers. KOGAS remained the dominant importer, while private direct importers continued to expand their role.

The chart below shows Korea’s LNG import trends. In 2024, KOGAS imported approximately 34.1mil. tons, down 2.2% from the previous year, while private direct importers increased imports to approximately 12.2 mil. tons, up 32.2%.  Private direct imports accounted for approximately 26.4% of Korea’s total LNG imports. Overall, LNG imports increased by approximately 5% year-on-year, supported by a diversified supply base. Australia, Qatar, the United States, Malaysia, Indonesia, Russia, and Oman remained among Korea’s major LNG suppliers in 2024.

On April 27, 2023, MOTIR announced the 15th Long-Term Natural Gas Supply and Demand Plan. According to the plan, Korea’s total demand for LNG is expected to decline by an average of 1.38% per year from 45.09mil. tons in 2023 to 37.66mil. tons in 2036. The 11th BPESD also increases the proportion of carbon-free power sources to 53% (340TWh) by 2030 and 70.7% (497.9TWh) by 2038. According to the plan, the proportion of power generation through LNG will be reduced from 167TWh in 2024 to 74.3TWh by 2038.  

There are 18 private direct importers of LNG. The government has allowed direct import of LNG under the limited conditions of corporate self-consumption since 1997, and the private sector’s direct import volume has steadily increased, supplying 26.1% of the total import volume of 46.33mil. tons in Korea as of 2024. The volume of LNG imports from the large conglomerates including SK, GS, POSCO, and GENCOs account for about 26.4% of Korea’s total direct import volume. The LNG value chain is primarily divided into three segments: upstream (development and production), midstream (liquefaction, transportation and distribution, LNG terminals), and downstream (consumption, including gas power generation and city gas).  

In the upstream sector, Korean companies such as KOGAS, SK E&S, and POSCO International are involved while KOGAS monopolizes imports and supply in the midstream and downstream sectors. These private companies operate energy-intensive businesses and import LNG for fuel or to run gas power plants. To ensure stable LNG supply, KOGAS secures 80-85% through long-term sales and purchase agreements (SPAs), with the remaining 15-20% acquired via spot trading based on price and supply conditions. Given that only about 35% of global LNG is traded on the spot market, it highlights KOGAS’s reliance on long-term SPAs. Consequently, direct importers tend to maintain a relatively higher proportion of spot trades, allowing them to maximize profits when market prices are low. These companies are also mandated to participate in power exchange tenders due to supply obligations necessitating the procurement of minimum volumes through long-term SPAs.  Although the 11th BPESD targets a sharp decline in LNG’s generation share from 28.1% in 2024 to 10.5% by 2038, LNG is still expected to play a flexible balancing role during Korea’s transition toward carbon-free energy.

Best Prospects 

The U.S. is considered a global leader in energy and related engineering services, nuclear fuel supply, LNG exports, and clean energy solutions. Companies with price-competitive technologies and services should have opportunities in the following areas:

•    Enriched uranium and nuclear fuel supply services
•    SMR and advanced nuclear cooperation, including supply chain and EPC participation
•    Dry cask storage and spent nuclear fuel management technologies
•    LNG supply, portfolio optimization, and flexible procurement solutions
•    Grid modernization, transmission solutions, and power equipment
•    Power equipment and clean firm power solutions for data centers, semiconductors, and advanced industrial demand

Opportunities

The Independent Power Producers (IPPs) consist of KEPCO’s six generation subsidiaries, known as GENCOs, as well as private power producers. GENCOs and IPPs have high levels of engagement and authority in fuel procurement, power generation investment, and technology adoption decisions.

The six GENCOs are:

•    Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) 
•    Korea South-East Power (KOEN) 
•    Korea Western Power (KOWEPO) 
•    Korea Midland Power (KOMIPO) 
•    Korea Southern Power (KOSPO) 
•    Korea East-West Power Company (EWP) 

Independent Power Producers (IPPs) include, but are not limited to:

•    POSCO International
•    GS EPS 
•    Pyeongtaek Energy Service 
•    S-Power Co., Ltd.
•    Paju Energy Service Co., Ltd.
•    GS Power
•    Goseong Green Power Co., Ltd.
•    Gangneung Eco Power (GEP) 
•    SC bluepower
•    Donghae IPP Power
•    Pocheon Power 
•    CGN Yulchon
•    SK E&S

Direct Importers of LNG

Importers within SK Group 

•    SK E&S
•    SK Hynix
•    SK Energy
•    Narae Energy Service Co., Ltd.
•    Paju Energy Service Co., Ltd., 
•    Yeoju Energy Service
•    Ulsan GPS
•    SK Incheon Petrochemical

Importers within GS Group 

•    GS EPS
•    GS Caltex
•    GS Power
•    SPPC Co., Ltd., 

Importers within POSCO Group 

•    POSCO
•    POSCO International

Others

•    S-Oil
•    Korea Zinc
•    Hanwha Solution
•    HD Hyundai Chemical
•    Tongyeong Eco Power
•    Lotte Ineos

Resources

•    Korea Energy Show, Busan 
•    International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power IAEA, Songdo, Incheon
Key Organizations
•    Ministry of Climate, Energy, and Environment (MCEE)
•    Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources (MOTIR)
•    Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO)
•    Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS)
•    Korea Power Exchange (KPX)
•    Korea Energy Agency (KEA)
•    Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI)

Local Contact

U.S. Commercial Service Korea    
U.S. Embassy Seoul
188 Sejong-daero, Jongro-gu
Seoul 03141, Korea
Tel: 82-2-397-4535
office.seoul@trade.gov
https://www.trade.gov/south-korea

×

Global Business Navigator Chatbot Beta

Welcome to the Global Business Navigator, an artificial intelligence (AI) Chatbot from the International Trade Administration (ITA). This tool, currently in beta version testing, is designed to provide general information on the exporting process and the resources available to assist new and experienced U.S. exporters. The Chatbot, developed using Microsoft’s Azure AI services, is trained on ITA’s export-related content and aims to quickly get users the information they need. The Chatbot is intended to make the benefits of exporting more accessible by understanding non-expert language, idiomatic expressions, and foreign languages.

Limitations

As a beta product, the Chatbot is currently being tested and its responses may occasionally produce inaccurate or incomplete information. The Chatbot is trained to decline out of scope or inappropriate requests. The Chatbot’s knowledge is limited to the public information on the Export Solutions web pages of Trade.gov, which covers a wide range of topics on exporting. While it cannot provide responses specific to a company’s product or a specific foreign market, its reference pages will guide you to other relevant government resources and market research. Always double-check the Chatbot’s responses using the provided references or by visiting the Export Solutions web pages on Trade.gov. Do not use its responses as legal or professional advice. Inaccurate advice from the Chatbot would not be a defense to violating any export rules or regulations.

Privacy

The Chatbot does not collect information about users and does not use the contents of users’ chat history to learn new information. All feedback is anonymous. Please do not enter personally identifiable information (PII), sensitive, or proprietary information into the Chatbot. Your conversations will not be connected to other interactions or accounts with ITA. Conversations with the Chatbot may be reviewed to help ITA improve the tool and address harmful, illegal, or otherwise inappropriate questions.

Translation

The Chatbot supports a wide range of languages. Because the Chatbot is trained in English and responses are translated, you should verify the translation. For example, the Chatbot may have difficulty with acronyms, abbreviations, and nuances in a language other than English.

Privacy Program | Information Quality Guidelines | Accessibility